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PARI PASSU CLAUSES AND THE 
SKEUOMORPH PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW 
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD† 
When sophisticated parties bargain with each other, they should 
negotiate terms that work to their mutual benefit. They should prevent 
bad clauses from entering transactions and rid themselves of those that 
might cause trouble. Doing anything else leaves money on the table. 
This line of thought lies at the bedrock of many modern accounts of 
contract, and we have grown quite comfortable with it. Perhaps too 
comfortable. Through their exploration of pari passu clauses, 
Professors Mitu Gulati, Robert E. Scott, and their many co-authors 
have forced us to have second thoughts.1 In a market with highly 
sophisticated players, a clause that serves no apparent purpose and is a 
source of considerable mischief has persisted for decades. 
Of course, there are circumstances in which suboptimal contract 
terms might emerge. Some markets may have too few sophisticated 
buyers. Reputational forces do not necessarily prevent advantage-
taking, especially if there is little repeat dealing. Sellers may be able to 
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 1. This revolutionary work is a most happy partnership between Mitu Gulati and Robert 
E. Scott, respectively, the person whose pioneering work has made sovereign debt a focal point 
of academic discourse, and the person who has defined the cutting edge of contracts scholarship 
in each of the last five decades. See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF 
MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (2012). Gulati 
and Scott’s excellent paper with Stephen J. Choi is the focal point of this essay. It finds them 
joined with someone whose empirical skills in law and finance are second to none. See Stephen J. 
Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial Boilerplate, 67 
DUKE L.J. 1 (2017).  
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exploit cognitive biases.2 But none of these qualifications apply to the 
trillion-dollar sovereign debt market, a sandbox in which only adults 
play and in which the dollar amounts are large enough to get anyone’s 
attention. A pari passu clause is like a clock that strikes thirteen. It is a 
puzzle in its own right and puts much else in doubt as well. 
A natural approach to the pari passu puzzle is to look for the 
clause’s closest cousins. One might search for other contract terms that 
persist even though they serve little or no purpose. For example, many 
contracts contain an “ipso facto” clause. It terminates the contract in 
the event one of the parties files for bankruptcy. Such clauses have 
been unenforceable since 1978,3 but they remain standard boilerplate 
nevertheless.4 A catalogue of such clauses might help explain why 
clauses that serve no apparent function become lodged in commercial 
boilerplate and remain there. 
In this short essay, however, I take a different tack. Before 
narrowing the focus to contract terms, it is useful to ask whether similar 
phenomena can be observed with respect to other product attributes. 
Contract terms are merely one type of product feature. A more 
generous warranty increases the value of a computer in the same way 
that a bigger screen does. Every product bundles features like large 
screens and warranties together. On the face of it, there is nothing 
special about contract terms. Market forces should work with respect 
to all product attributes in the same way.5 
Regardless of whether it is a contract term or something else, it 
would seem that a product feature that comes at a cost, serves no 
purpose, and is not even understood by consumers should not take 
hold and persist, at least not in competitive markets between 
sophisticated actors. The forces of a competitive market should 
eradicate such features, regardless of whether they are contract terms 
or physical attributes. But it turns out that this is not the case. There 
are many examples outside of contract law and they come in different 
flavors. 
 
 2. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1409–10 (2004). 
 3. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 365(e), 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (2012). 
 4. See DAVID ZARFES & MICHAEL L. BLOOM, CONTRACTS AND COMMERCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS 299–300 (2011) (discussing prevalence of “ipso facto” clauses that make 
bankruptcy an event of default and noting that these are commonly included in contracts). 
 5. For an excellent essay in the same spirit that connects the production of contracts with 
the production of ordinary goods, see Barak Richman, Contracts Meet Henry Ford, 40 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 77, 79 (2011). 
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A pari passu clause is what is known as a “skeuomorph.”6 A 
skeuomorph is one of the types of product features that persist even 
though they serve no function and are potentially costly. A 
skeuomorph’s defining feature is that it is adapted from a previous 
version of the product where it did serve a purpose.7 Examples of 
skeuomorphs outside the context of contracts are exceedingly well 
documented and span all of human history.8 This essay links this 
literature to pari passu clauses. To begin, however, it explores the more 
general phenomenon of the persistence of undesirable product 
attributes even in the face of strong competitive forces. 
I.  IMPERFECT GOODS IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS 
Contractual undertakings are one part of the bundle that comes 
with anything purchased in the marketplace.9 A personal computer has 
many different features. It has a screen of a particular size, its battery 
has a certain life, and the chips have a designated speed. There is also 
a great deal of software, starting with the code that comes embedded 
on the chips themselves. And there are various contract terms. 
The typical consumer is going to be aware of some of the features 
of the product she buys, but not of others. The typical consumer knows 
something about size and resolution of the computer screen, but may 
know little about the speed of the chips. She may know little or nothing 
about software and other pieces of intellectual property. The same is 
true with various promises and undertakings included in the contract. 
The consumer may know something about the warranty. For example, 
she might have separately purchased a service contract, which is merely 
 
 6. The idea that skeuomorphs include contract clauses among their number does not seem 
to have been noted before. A Westlaw search shows that the term itself has been used only four 
times in law review articles, in each instance to talk about their use in computer interfaces. See, 
e.g., Aaron E. Ghirardelli, Rules of Engagement in the Conflict Between Businesses and 
Consumers in Online Contracts, 93 OR. L. REV. 719, 732 (2015) (“Apple gently guided its users to 
learn how to operate a smartphone with touch screens by using skeuomorphic design.”). 
 7. A skeuomorph is “[a]n object or feature which imitates the design of a similar artefact 
made from another material,” or, specifically in the technology context, “[a]n element of a 
graphical user interface which mimics a physical object.” Skeuomorph, OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2017). 
 8. Although the phenomenon was observed long before, the word “skeuomorph” first 
appears in H. Colley March, The Meaning of Ornament; or Its Archaeology and Its Psychology, 7 
TRANSACTIONS LANCASHIRE & CHESHIRE ANTIQUARIAN SOC’Y 160, 166 (1889). For a more 
recent discussion, see Robert Adam, Tin Gods: Technology and Contemporary Architecture, 
ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN, Oct. 1989, at 15. 
 9. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, RECONSTRUCTING CONTRACTS 124–27 (2013). 
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an extended warranty by another name. But there are going to be other 
terms that she knows nothing about, such as whether the form contract 
contains an arbitration clause. 
Many of the contract terms that are close to the hearts of law 
professors—such as mandatory arbitration clauses—may simply be no 
more important to the typical consumer than the technical details of a 
computer’s operating system. Neither has an effect on the amount she 
is willing to pay. But it is a mistake to think that contract terms are 
immune to competitive pressures merely because most individuals do 
not know about them. 
The typical individual consumer may be insensitive to the 
presence or absence of particular contract terms just as she is 
insensitive to many other product features. Nevertheless, when 
markets are competitive, sellers care intensely about attracting the 
customer who is just on the cusp of buying somewhere else. The 
consumer that matters is the one at the margin, and the marginal 
consumer makes a trade-off. In contrast to the typical consumer, the 
consumer at the margin weighs the value to her of a particular contract 
term, a chip with a certain speed, or any other product attribute on the 
one hand, and the higher price that the seller will demand if she offers 
it on the other.10  
The typical layperson will not notice small changes in price, but 
such changes matter because of the behavior of the consumer at the 
margin. Inferior products should sell for a lower price. If a product is 
being sold with a feature that serves no purpose and is costly, the 
marginal consumer is likely to notice and lower the price that she is 
willing to pay accordingly. Someone can make money by offering the 
same product without that feature and charging the same amount. In a 
market in which goods have suboptimal product features, opportunity 
beckons. There are, of course, situations in which markets fail, but 
when the stakes are high enough and the parties sophisticated enough, 
product features that serve no function and are costly should not 
persist. Their existence is an opportunity for someone to make 
money.11 
 
 10. This is not to say, however, that regulation is inappropriate when marginal consumers 
drive sellers towards clauses that are in consumers’ interests. It may, for example, be important 
to ban arbitration clauses even when rational consumers would not bargain for that outcome. See 
id. at 136–40. 
 11. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect 
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 636–39 (1979). 
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A useless product feature in a computer that makes the computer 
even a little more likely to fail or a little harder to repair should not 
persist. For the same reason, a clause that serves no purpose should not 
survive either. For all the reasons that Choi, Gulati, and Scott have 
suggested, competitive forces should force out pari passu clauses.12 
Capital markets are global. Someone issuing a bond or any other 
security who offers suboptimal terms should not be able to raise capital 
on terms as favorable as she could if she provided better terms. 
Issuers of sovereign debt should offer terms that work to the 
mutual benefit of borrower and lender. Both are interested in ensuring 
that debt can be restructured when the sovereign encounters financial 
reverses and finds itself unable to pay what it owes.13 A bond that could 
not be restructured when the creditors as a group wanted it to be 
restructured should be less attractive and carry a higher interest rate. 
A sovereign that is not able to repay a debt in full, but that is able to 
repay 30 cents on the dollar, is more likely to repay something if the 
debt can be restructured. It is therefore odd that sovereign debt 
offerings regularly include an obstacle to restructuring such as a pari 
passu clause that has no offsetting benefit. 
To be sure, the costs of a pari passu clause are not large relative to 
the total amount of sovereign debt. The pari passu clause matters only 
if there is a default, and rates of default are quite low. Those who buy 
and sell sovereign bonds are going to spend much more time trying to 
estimate the risk of default than evaluating the risk of a term that 
operates only in the wake of a default. Nevertheless, in a trillion-dollar 
market, even the smallest effects translate into real money. The 
litigation over pari passu clauses alone has likely consumed tens of 
millions of dollars in legal fees. All of these are deadweight losses. 
But one should not overstate the power of market forces with 
respect to either pari passu clauses or any other product attribute. To 
say that the forces of competition push parties towards the Pareto 
frontier is not to say that they are powerful enough to eliminate all 
 
 12. See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 58 (“Contract theory predicts that contract drafters will 
revise standard contract terms when faced with an interpretation adverse to their clients’ 
interests.” (footnote omitted)). 
 13. It is possible to argue that a sovereign might deliberately make restructuring of bonds 
hard. Although costly ex post, making restructuring hard might serve as a commitment device. By 
ensuring that difficulties in bad states of the world are costly, the borrower gives itself an incentive 
to ensure that it never finds itself in them. This is a clever argument. Too clever. As Choi, Gulati, 
and Scott explain, this potential justification for pari passu clauses is inconsistent with the way 
pari passu clauses vary across different types of borrowers.  
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imperfection. To the contrary, if the pressure of competition were so 
powerful that buyers paid attention to every variation in product 
quality, markets as we know them could not exist. 
Instead of pari passu clauses, consider another environment where 
the forces of competition are unusually strong—a commodities market. 
Even here, competition does not ensure uniformity. Indeed, a 
commodities market depends upon classification and standardization.14 
It is not possible to have a market where commodities sell at a readily 
ascertainable price if each bag of corn or bushel of wheat comes from 
a different farmer and varies in quality. Once a system for assessing the 
quality of corn comes into being, corn from each farm can be graded 
and then stored with other corn of the same grade. To work effectively, 
however, buyers and sellers in a commodities market must be willing 
to buy and sell any corn that is graded No. 2 at the same price. This is 
possible only if buyers and sellers do not take into account variations 
in quality within each grade. 
There are, however, always variations in quality within each grade, 
even with respect to ordinary commodities like corn or wheat. Corn, 
for example, can have anywhere between three percent and four 
percent broken kernels and foreign matter and still count as No. 2 
grade corn.15 One lot of corn graded No. 2 might contain only 3.3 
percent broken kernels and foreign matter, while another might 
contain 3.8 percent. The first lot of corn is better, but both lots are still 
graded No. 2 and both trade at the same price. Under conditions of 
perfect competition, this would not be possible.  
Markets are designed to ensure that people in a market cannot 
exploit variation in the quality of standardized goods. One cannot 
make money by selling No. 2 corn that is below average quality or 
buying No. 2 corn that is above average. That some costs exist to 
prevent perfect sorting in the market for corn is a happy accident.16 In 
other markets, more needs to be done.17 
 
 14. See WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE’S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST 
114–19 (1991). 
 15. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., GRAIN INSPECTION, PACKERS & STOCKYARDS ADMIN., 
FED. GRAIN INSPECTION SERV., U.S. STANDARDS: SUBPART D—UNITED STATES STANDARDS 
FOR CORN 3 (Sept. 1996), https://www.gipsa.usda.gov/fgis/standards/810corn.pdf [https://perma.
cc/M7FN-NKQC]. 
 16. In this case, the costs are those associated with inspecting individual lots and the costs of 
segregating those that are above (or below) par and buying (or selling) only those lots. Such 
cherry-picking is costly, and the other parties to the transaction that benefit from standardization 
have no incentive to make it cheap. 
 17. In the wholesale diamond market, at least as it existed in the 1980s, favored buyers were 
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The existence of variations within a grade for standardized 
products that are traded in well-functioning markets shows that 
competitive forces are not strong enough to allow even salient 
variations in product quality (such as the amount of foreign matter in 
a bushel of corn) to be fully reflected in the price. Commodity markets 
require standardization, and standardization is not possible if 
competitive forces worked entirely without friction. The existence of 
commodity markets illustrates a more general point about the frictions 
that exist in every market. Just as corn with different amounts of 
foreign matter can trade at the same price, product features that are 
suboptimal can persist as long as there are some forces in place that put 
a brake on change. 
The QWERTY keyboard is a good example. This keyboard is 
tolerably well designed.18 The mechanical action on early typewriters 
was subject to jamming. To slow the first typists—most of whom typed 
with one finger—letters that commonly appear together in English 
were placed on opposite sides of the keyboard. As it happens, this 
configuration is a desirable attribute for touch typists. A finger on one 
hand can reach for a key while a finger on the other hand is striking 
another, increasing the typist’s speed. In another happy accident, the 
manufacturer of the first QWERTY keyboards wanted sales people to 
be able to show the machine to good advantage, and it did this by 
putting all the letters for a long and salient word on a single row. (The 
word was “typewriter.”) Hence, many of the most commonly used 
letters found themselves on a single row. This also enhances speed. 
But the QWERTY layout is not optimal. Not all of the most 
common letters are on the same row, and the row with the most 
common letters is not the home row where the fingers rest. As a result, 
a QWERTY keyboard requires the fingers to move more than they 
need to. This both reduces speed and increases fatigue. 
The QWERTY keyboard, however, is good enough such that the 
forces that push towards change are not sufficient to overcome the 
inertia of the status quo. Given that alternative keyboards are only a 
 
given a box (or “sight”) of diamonds of a particular grade on a take-it-or-leave-it price. A buyer 
who refused to take the sight she was offered would not be invited to return. Because the 
wholesaler enjoyed a cartel, it had the ability to pick and choose among potential buyers. This 
arrangement prevented cherry-picking. No one could buy only sights in which the diamonds were 
better on average than other sights within the same grade. See Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, 
The Economics of Block Booking, 26 J.L. & ECON. 497, 500–02 (1983).  
 18. See S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1, 16–
17 (1990). 
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little better, it probably does not make sense for someone who already 
knows how to type to switch. Switching keyboards requires learning to 
type all over again.19 Moreover, once one switches keyboards, it is hard 
to switch back. 
Nor is it costless for those learning to type for the first time. In the 
past, those who learned on a nonstandard keyboard risked finding their 
skills useless when they found themselves in a workplace that used 
QWERTY keyboards. They had to bring their own typewriters with 
them. This particular obstacle has largely disappeared, as the vast 
majority of typing is now done on computers. Software makes the 
reconfiguration of keys easy, and touch typists do not need to look at 
the physical keyboard. But even today, there are costs to being able to 
type only on a nonstandard keyboard, and these are large enough to 
deter all but a few people from learning to type on anything but a 
QWERTY keyboard.20 
The explanation for the persistence of the QWERTY keyboard is 
much the same as for any other product feature that has become a 
standard. If a nonstandard keyboard brought even a small 
improvement in speed or reduction in fatigue for each individual typist, 
the benefits across hundreds of millions of typists would be enormous.21 
But the benefits to any individual typist are not large enough to 
overcome the costs that a person suffers from being an outlier, and no 
entrepreneur (at least none so far) has figured out a way to make 
money by disrupting the equilibrium. 
The same forces are at work with sovereign bonds. If no frictions 
stood in the way of change, issuers of bonds that had pari passu clauses 
would have to offer their investors higher yields. Because such clauses 
make the bonds harder to restructure, they are offering bonds that are 
 
 19. Indeed, it may be harder to learn an alternative keyboard once one has already typed on 
a QWERTY keyboard than if one has never touch-typed before. Things learned by rote are hard 
to unlearn. 
 20. Among other things, learning materials for nonstandard keyboards are harder to come 
by. Moreover, programming nonstandard keyboards for smart phones and the like is not always 
easy.  
 21. Some have argued that no empirical case has been made for keyboards such as “Dvorak.”  
See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 18, at 21 (asserting that “claims for the superiority of the 
Dvorak keyboard are suspect”). But it would seem unlikely that the QWERTY keyboard would 
be optimal given its design history. Even small marginal improvements that individual typists 
scarcely noticed could create huge aggregate benefits. Even if an alternative keyboard were not 
faster, it could be less fatiguing or put less stress on the wrists. The benefits of something as 
ubiquitous as a typewriter keyboard do not have to be large for each individual for there to be 
enormous social benefits. 
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worth less in bad states of the world. But frictions do exist. The issuer 
will not switch from selling bonds with pari passu clauses if switching 
comes with costs and if individual traders will not fully incorporate the 
benefits of being free of pari passu clauses into the price they are 
willing to pay. 
In pricing a bond, the main event is assessing the likelihood of 
default. Default rates for sovereign bonds vary enormously, especially 
among those that are not investment grade, the place where pari passu 
clauses matter the most. To know whether a bond is being sold at a 
good price, one needs to estimate the probability of default. This 
probability is clouded in considerable uncertainty. The probability of a 
sovereign bond default turns on an assessment of geopolitical risks that 
are extremely hard to assess over a time horizon of more than two or 
three years.22 This sort of variation is an order of magnitude greater 
than any plausible effect of differences among bonds with various types 
of pari passu clauses. 
Moreover, those who buy these bonds have expertise in assessing 
default risk, but considerably less expertise in assessing legal risk. In 
theory, a pari passu clause reduces the value of a bond; but to know by 
how much, one needs to predict when litigation might arise and how it 
will be resolved. To understand how puzzling the persistence of pari 
passu clauses has been, one needs to look at the ex ante costs, not the 
ones incurred ex post. It would be odd to think that bond traders 
thought this cost especially high when, as Choi, Gulati, and Scott show, 
legal experts thought the risk low, even after two lower court opinions 
suggested otherwise.23 If the experts assessing the likely outcome of 
litigation in the Southern District of New York were so wrong, then 
one should not expect that bond traders would gauge it accurately at 
the time bonds are issued. This is especially true when, by any account, 
the returns from accurately assessing default risk are so much greater 
than from accurately assessing the costs of pari passu clauses. 
It is worth pointing out that, in calculating its sovereign debt 
ratings, S&P focuses only on the likelihood of default. It ignores the 
second-order effect—recovery in the event of default. A legal risk that 
affects this recovery is a third-order effect. Rating agencies care about 
 
 22. See PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT? HOW CAN 
WE KNOW?, at xix–xx (2017 ed.) (noting empirical finding that experts as a group do no better 
than chance or simple algorithms with respect to predicting global events three years hence). 
 23. See Choi et al, supra note 1, at 46–50 (providing accounts of sovereign debt lawyers as to 
why the pari passu clause went unmodified despite these court decisions). 
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what bond buyers care about. If they do not care much about a second-
order effect, it should not be surprising that they would ignore a third-
order effect. A bond buyer who prices bonds with different sorts of pari 
passu clauses identically is acting the same way as a buyer who treats 
all No. 2 corn identically. 
None of this is to deny that pari passu clauses are costly and that 
they would disappear if nothing counteracted the competitive 
pressures.24 But, as Choi, Gulati, and Scott show, there are some forces 
at work that make changing pari passu clauses just costly enough to 
retard the migration towards better terms.25 They point first to legacy 
costs. No one wants to put better language in a new instrument if it will 
cast a bad light on previous ones from the same issuer.  
In addition, the value of a sovereign bond to the issuer turns on 
the willingness of those in the market to buy it on favorable terms. Two 
otherwise identical sovereign bonds with different types of pari passu 
clauses are like two batches of No. 2 grade corn with different amounts 
of foreign matter.26 It might seem that, with millions or perhaps tens of 
millions of dollars at stake, someone would demand more for a bond 
with a better term. This would in turn give everyone an incentive to get 
rid of terms that did not work. But, as in the case of the QWERTY 
keyboard, as long as individual traders do not value the change, change 
will not happen unless someone comes along and pushes the market as 
a whole to accept a new standard.27 
There are risks associated with buying something new. Lawyers 
can explain why it is a good idea, but they are not infallible. After all, 
these are the same lawyers who thought that there was little risk that 
judges in the Southern District of New York would misconstrue pari 
passu clauses. Trusting lawyers to draft a new and improved sovereign 
debt instrument that looks unfamiliar adds a new risk and holds little 
prospect for additional profit. Successful bond traders can make money 
trading sovereign bonds with pari passu clauses. They have no need to 
 
 24. See id. at 59–65 (cataloguing reasons why the pari passu clause went unmodified in the 
face of adverse court decisions).   
 25. See id., at 16 n.43. 
 26. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 15, at 3 (noting that corn qualifies as No. 2 grade 
as long as the amount of broken kernels and foreign matter ranges between 3 and 4 percent). 
 27. To use Cass Sunstein’s turn of phrase, a person who brings about such a change is a 
“norm entrepreneur.” The norm entrepreneur can take several different guises. See Cass R. 
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996). In the case of pari 
passu clauses, change came about in part through the efforts of Gulati and Scott themselves. They 
organized a conference that brought the major players together and eventually allowed them to 
coalesce jointly around a new standard. 
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switch. New contract language may be like New Coke. It does not 
matter how good it tastes if consumers are used to the original.28 
Finally, buyers of sovereign debt benefit from trading a product 
that comes with a set of standard terms. They may resist better terms 
even if they are better merely because they are different. Different 
legal terms, even if they are better, make it harder to compare bonds. 
A buyer who wants to focus on the likelihood of default across 
different sovereign lenders finds it costly to account for different 
contract terms at the same time. A commodity trader who is good at 
predicting movements in the price of No. 2 corn is not interested in 
spending time looking for corn that might be better than No. 2 corn. It 
only needs to be different, regardless of whether it is better or worse, 
for it to be less attractive. 
Once the costs of changing a particular practice are greater than 
the costs of not changing it, an imperfect product feature can persist 
for a long time. Standards, once established, are hard to change. Until 
recently, most people associated screw tops on wine with cheap and 
corked wine bottles with expensive. You could not sell a fine wine with 
a screw top even though it was a better technology. 
In short, as long as recently minted 28-year-old MBAs who know 
everything have a check list that tells them to ensure that some sort of 
pari passu clause is in sovereign debt instruments, it will take a lot to 
make them do anything else. Even when a change makes sense, it is not 
likely to happen instantaneously. There is always a lag between the 
time an opportunity arises and when someone takes advantage of it. 
The technology needed for an overnight package delivery service 
existed in the early 1960s with the introduction of small jets like the 
DC-9 and the Boeing 727, but it was not until the 1970s that such 
services were available.29 It takes a long time to overcome the forces 
that resist change. 
Contracts cannot be rewritten every time a judge makes a bone-
headed decision. That pari passu clauses were a source of trouble was 
not fully appreciated until the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the 
 
 28. Consumers emphatically rejected New Coke, even though most preferred it in blind taste 
tests. See Gregory S. Carpenter & Kent Nakamoto, Consumer Preference Formation and 
Pioneering Advantage, 26 J. MARKETING RES. 285, 297 (1989). 
 29. To be sure, the founder of FedEx had the idea for the business in 1965. But it was not 
immediately obvious to others. Indeed, he set it out in an undergraduate term paper and received 
only an average grade. See Connecting People and Possibilities: The History of FedEx, FEDEX, 
http://about.van.fedex.com/our-story/history-timeline/history/ [https://perma.cc/E4DB-C5BY]. 
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Argentinian bond case.30 Perhaps only at this point were the benefits 
of overcoming the costs of inertia large enough to justify action. And 
only a few months passed from the time this happened until the time 
that major actors came together and agreed on a change. The puzzle 
may be not that it took so long, but that it took place so quickly. 
Even if it is possible to understand why, once pari passu clauses 
were part of sovereign debt instruments it was so hard to get rid of 
them, there still remains the question of how useless and potentially 
costly product features can take root in the first instance. I turn to this 
question in the next part. 
II.  SKEUOMORPHS AND CONTRACT TERMS 
Contract terms are not like corn. It is hard to harvest corn that 
does not contain some broken kernels and foreign matter. Not so with 
legal terms. There is no reason to put pointless provisions into a 
contract in the first place. Benjamin Chabot and Gulati have 
speculated about the particular circumstances of pari passu clauses,31 
but it is again useful to connect what they observed to the more general 
phenomenon of useless features entering products in the first instance. 
For thousands of years, new products have replaced old ones. 
Metal pointed spears replaced ones tipped with flint. Baskets made 
from straw were replaced by vessels shaped from clay. Stone columns 
replaced wooden ones. New products, however, often incorporate 
features from old ones even when they are unnecessary. The first metal 
spears had ornamentation that mimicked the hide formerly used to 
bind the flint to the metal. Clay pots had ornamentation that mimicked 
straw. To this day, Doric columns have triglyphs centered above each 
column representing the ends of wooden beams that columns once 
supported when these columns were made of wood, a practice that 
more or less stopped several thousand years ago. To take a more recent 
and more quotidian example, maple syrup is often sold in a glass bottle 
with a small handle that serves no discernable utilitarian purpose. This 
is a relic of the time when maple syrup came in jugs and the handles 
were large enough to be useful. This phenomenon—of a product 
feature persisting when incorporated in a new environment in which it 
no longer serves a function—is well known and has a name: 
 
 30. See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 201 (2013), denying cert. to 
699 F.3d 246 (2012). 
 31. See Benjamin Chabot & Mitu Gulati, Santa Anna and His Black Eagle: The Origins of 
Pari Passu?, 9 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 216, 216–17, 235–36 (2014). 
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skeuomorph.32  
A pari passu clause in a sovereign debt contract is an instance of 
this phenomenon. Roman and Anglo-American law have long 
accepted the principle of pro-rata sharing: whenever creditors act 
collectively against a common debtor, they divide whatever they collect 
among themselves in proportion to the size of their claims.33 Such pari 
passu provisions exist in virtually every bankruptcy statute and have 
long been standard fare in agreements that creditors reach among 
themselves when they pursue debtors outside of bankruptcy. 
Given that such a clause is utterly common in the context of an 
ordinary loan, it is not surprising that it entered into the sovereign debt 
market. As Chabot and Gulati have suggested, lenders from countries 
with smaller gunboats may have incorporated pari passu language 
when they were writing their contracts. They might have been trying to 
have the sovereign acknowledge that they should be treated the same 
as lenders from countries that wielded more military power. That they 
borrowed a familiar term in debtor-creditor law to serve this end is not 
particularly surprising. Nor would it be unusual if pari passu language 
entered sovereign debt contracts for an even less compelling reason. 
Even if sovereign lending is different from ordinary lending, the 
natural impulse of the lawyer, like any other craftsman, is to draw on 
the familiar in crafting something new, whether it serves a useful 
purpose or not. 
Consumers (whether buyers of sovereign debt or anything else) 
expect products to have certain characteristics merely because they 
have become accustomed to them.34 Consumers never completely 
understand the products that they buy. No one in the world today 
possesses the human capital needed to make something even as simple 
 
 32. See March, supra note 8, at 166; supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 33. It should be noted, however, that there is nothing magical about pro-rata sharing. Other, 
equally coherent sharing rules also exist. See, e.g., Robert J. Aumann & Michael Maschler, Game 
Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud, 36 J. ECON. THEORY 195, 198–202 
(1985) (discussing the “contested-garment” rule and proving its logical coherence). 
 34. Once an attribute becomes part of a product, it tends to persist. In a discussion of 
consumer goods, Carpenter and Nakamoto show that “in the early stages of many markets, 
consumers may know little about the importance of attributes or their ideal combination” and 
note that “[a] successful early entrant can have a major influence on how attributes are valued 
and on the ideal attribute combination.” See Carpenter & Nakamoto, supra note 28, at 286. 
Hence, consumers value familiar features when a product is made with a new technology or 
transplanted to a new environment. This logic may be applied to financial instruments to the 
extent one accepts the idea that those who acquire bonds, because they are usually not lawyers, 
will not be perfectly informed about all the attributes of what they are buying. 
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as an ordinary pencil from raw materials. Everyone, including buyers 
of sovereign debt, must rely on heuristics and what is familiar. 
Buyers of maple syrup want to see a small handle on the bottle. It 
serves no purpose, but it is what consumers have come to expect. Blue 
jeans are no longer made for working men who carry pocket watches, 
but buyers of blue jeans want a watch pocket all the same, even though 
they have no idea of the purpose it serves and have no use for it. 
Everyone expects Worcestershire Sauce bottles to come wrapped in 
paper even though the reason for doing this has long disappeared.35 
Tagines took a particular shape for functional reasons when they were 
made of clay, and they retained this shape when made of aluminum 
even though there was no longer a functional reason for doing so.36 
Skeuomorphs can be found everywhere on the “desktops” of personal 
computers.37 
In short, the idea that a clause could be added to a contract and 
remain there merely because everyone expected it to be there suggests 
nothing special about either pari passu clauses in particular or contract 
terms more generally. The same forces are at work as with ordinary 
product attributes. Crafting legal prose is hard, and few contracts are 
ever written from scratch. Lawyers almost always start with a template 
taken from someplace else. For this reason, those who draft contracts 
are likely to import features from earlier contracting environments, 
even when they serve no purpose, merely because they are familiar. To 
give another example involving financial instruments, the first railway 
bonds were based on real estate mortgages. They still bear some of the 
attributes of real estate mortgages, and not always for the better.38 
We need to ask whether contract terms like pari passu clauses are 
something more than one more example of a sort of imperfection 
found across all the types of product attributes. One message at least 
 
 35. It was intended to minimize breakage during an era in which it was shipped by sea. See 
About Us, LEA & PERRINS, http://www.leaperrins.com/History [https://perma.cc/5523-6V8Y]. 
 36. See Georgina Russell, The Birth of Skeuomorph: A Terra Cotta Tajine and Its Aluminum 
Counterpart, 3 J. MUSEUM ETHNOGRAPHY 113, 113–17 (1991). 
 37. As noted above, this sort of skeuomorph accounts for the only use of the word in the 
legal literature. See Zachary Rosenberg, Returning to Plato’s Cave: Metadata’s Shadows in the 
Courtroom, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 439, 443 (2016) (“A skeuomorphic computer interface is designed 
to emulate the physical world. . . . [T]he ‘desktop’ looks like the top of a desk, replete with 
scattered files, folders, and a trashcan; word processors mimic typewriters by displaying what you 
type on a representation of 8½ X 11 inch paper . . . .” (footnote omitted)); supra note 6. 
 38. This has led the analogy between foreclosure and reorganization to be pressed too hard. 
See Douglas G. Baird, Priority Matters: Absolute Priority, Relative Priority, and the Costs of 
Bankruptcy, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 804 n.76 (2017). 
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implicit in much of the work on pari passu clauses is that their presence 
in contracts unsettles the conventional understanding of contract law. 
Black holes, after all, need to be taken seriously. They swallow 
everything around them, destroy information, and are otherwise major 
nuisances. But one needs to be careful to make sure that the metaphor 
is not itself doing the heavy lifting. 
Pari passu clauses illustrate how a useless contract term can 
become part of a standard commercial transaction and remain in place 
for a long time. Whether one uses the attention-getting, but somewhat 
imprecise metaphor of “black holes,” or the more precise, but 
decidedly more pedantic “skeuomorph,” one still needs to establish 
how much the existence of this phenomenon requires us to reassess our 
understanding of contracts. 
Choi, Gulati, and Scott show that the presence of useless terms in 
contracts can impose costs. But it is not clear how large these costs are. 
They point to the municipal bond market as a place where we are likely 
to find contract terms that are like pari passu clauses in sovereign debt 
instruments.39 They are surely correct that many who acquire these 
bonds have been woefully ill-informed about what will happen in the 
unlikely event that a municipality files for bankruptcy. They know 
nothing about what counts as a “special revenue” bond, even though 
in Chapter 9 the difference between the holder of a special revenue 
bond and the holder of an ordinary bond is the difference between a 
secured and an unsecured creditor. In such an environment, it would 
not be surprising if many of the terms in municipal bonds did not serve 
their intended purpose or indeed any purpose at all. 
But the rate of default on municipal bonds is extraordinarily low. 
Once the risks—and therefore the costs—are high enough, the 
dynamics change. Once a municipality is sufficiently distressed, rating 
agencies and buyers begin to take note. Imperfections in contract 
terms, like imperfect discrimination between goods of varying quality, 
can persist only if they are not too costly. 
In its latest long-term bond issue, the financially distressed 
Chicago Public Schools system (CPS) went through enormous effort to 
craft a bond that would be treated as a special revenue bond in a 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy. More precisely, CPS went through enormous 
effort to craft an instrument for which a law firm would write an 
opinion letter stating that it would be treated as a special revenue bond. 
 
 39. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 71. 
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The existence of the opinion letter drove the rating CPS was able to 
secure for the bond from a rating agency and this in turn dramatically 
lowered the interest it had to pay.40 
Those at CPS who issued these bonds understood the way the 
intricate definitional provisions of Chapter 9 operated better than any 
law professor even though they were not themselves lawyers. The 
characteristics of special revenue bonds is an obscure area at the 
intersection between bankruptcy and municipal finance, but once the 
prospect of default becomes large, the frictions that prevent the 
migration towards more efficient terms become easier to overcome. 
Legal terms that serve no function do present a challenge that 
other similarly useless product attributes do not. In the case of an 
ordinary skeuomorph, there is no need, other than academic curiosity, 
to know why it is there. One can buy a maple syrup jar with a minuscule 
and pointless handle without having to give it meaning or explain its 
purpose. Legal terms are different. Judges must interpret contracts. 
As a general matter, judges usually ask, in one way or another, 
what a buyer and seller meant when they entered a particular contract, 
even though in many cases, the buyer never even read the terms. The 
inquiry is decidedly counterfactual. The buyer can have no intentions 
with respect to terms that she never saw. It is useful, however, to 
maintain this fiction when there are terms that marginal buyers may 
have seen or that marginal buyers may have known about. 
Skeuomorphs present a bigger problem. By definition, neither party 
had any intention with respect to them. The judge is asked to interpret 
words that the parties themselves did not understand. 
It might seem sensible to treat contract terms that serve no 
purpose simply as noise words. One could read the sovereign debt 
contract as if the pari passu clause was not there. We do something 
similar when trying to solve the battle of the forms. When parties enter 
into a contract by exchanging forms that contain inconsistent 
boilerplate, the conventional approach is to allow the conflicting terms 
to knock each other out and to replace them with the default terms that 
contract law supplies.41 
There are difficulties with treating contractual skeuomorphs as 
 
 40. See Juan Perez Jr., Upcoming CPS Bond Issue Gets Favorable Outlook from Wall Street, 
CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 9, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-
chicago-public-schools-bonds-met-20161208-story.html [https://perma.cc/FR5U-74DP]. 
 41. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: 
A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1246–47 (1982). 
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noise, however. First, it is hard to know whether a word is a 
skeuomorph or whether it serves some purpose.42 It is still possible that 
the term serves some purpose even if most parties use the term by rote 
and have no idea what it means. Law firm associates might tinker with 
pari passu clauses without knowing what they mean, but this does not 
distinguish pari passu clauses from other clauses, and many of these do 
matter. Law firm associates do much, indeed entirely too much, cutting 
and pasting of terms without knowing what they mean.43 
There are many product features that are useful even if the vast 
majority of people who use them have no idea why they are there. The 
caps to plastic ballpoint pens have holes in their tops for a reason. 
Children and even some absent-minded adults chew on and then 
accidently swallow them. The hole ensures that they will not suffocate. 
It is a useful product feature that those who make a new plastic pen 
might copy without knowing the function the hole served. It is a good 
thing that such features persist. Even if someone makes a pen without 
the hole, only that person’s buyer is worse off. Everyone else will still 
follow the norm, even if they do not know why it makes sense to do so. 
Just as people can copy useless features without knowing why, they can 
copy beneficial ones as well. 
A judge that dismisses a useful contract term as noise can cause 
considerable mischief because she is doing more than someone who 
copies a product feature whose useful purpose she does not 
understand. A judge can extinguish valuable, but obscure contract 
terms. If a judge mistakenly accepts a party’s argument that a contract 
term is just a skeuomorph, she establishes a precedent that makes the 
clause useless for others, even for the people who used it deliberately 
and who understand how it affects the contract. 
There is another reason for a judge to do her best to give contract 
terms meaning even when their purpose is hard to discern. As soon as 
judges treat obscure contract terms as meaningless, there is no pressure 
 
 42. Some have argued, for example, that ipso facto clauses, even though unenforceable, still 
serve some purpose. See ZARFES & BLOOM, supra note 4, at 299–300. 
 43. For example, when a secured loan is paid off, law firm associates typically assemble the 
required documentation, and this documentation provides for the termination statements 
associated with the relevant UCC financing filings. Many associates assemble this paperwork 
without understanding what the termination statement is doing. They never took secured 
transactions and are simply following a checklist. But it can prove costly if they get it wrong. For 
a case in which an associate ignored the advice of a paralegal and referenced the wrong 
termination statement and caused a $1.5 billion loss, see Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors 
of Motors Liquidation Co. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 755 
F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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for parties to change them. As soon as courts relieve parties of the fear 
that keeping useless language in contracts might have consequences, 
they will have less incentive to fix them. The battle-of-the-forms might 
never have spawned the vast number of litigated disputes it did if courts 
had been more willing to insist that language has consequences. 
Courts do not need to pretend that they are trying to divine the 
intentions of the parties when interpreting a contract. They listen to 
advocates and do their best to capture what the words mean in the 
relevant merchant community. They might end up doing something 
that experts do not like, but experts are always free to get together (as 
they did in the wake of the Argentinian debt case) and draft new 
language. Judicial efforts to interpret language and give it some 
meaning are likely to make contract drafters more cautious. Such an 
interpretative strategy, of course, will prove costly in some instances, 
but these costs give everyone an incentive to pay more attention to 
their contracts or suffer the consequences. It is possible that Choi, 
Gulati, and Scott’s exciting discovery, as valuable as it is, does not 
require a shift in judicial interpretative strategies after all. Small brush 
fires keep forests healthy. They burn away the undergrowth, add 
nutrients to the soil, and make sure that large trees flourish. 
 
